What Xi wanted from Kim and what it means for the US

Source: Washington Examiner | March 28, 2018 | Tom Rogan

Meeting Kim Jong Un in Beijing this week, Xi Jinping was focused on China’s long-term interests. To that end, the Chinese president would have sought two core commitments from the North Korean leader.

First, Kim’s undertaking not to sign any agreement without first consulting and receiving the assent of Beijing to that deal’s content.

Second, Kim’s tying of Chinese strategic interests into the envelope of any medium-term deal with the U.S.

legal questions over whether Trump’s alleged offer of a pardon in the midst of the special counsel investigation could constitute an obstruction of justice.

These two factors bear close consideration in that some observers seem to think Kim’s high society Beijing visit (he got a state banquet and an honor guard) is evidence of Xi’s pursuit of warmer relations with Kim. That analysis is incorrect.

In fact, this trip was a very Chinese way of reminding Kim that North Korean leaders must bow to Beijing. The meeting was on Chinese soil, and the events were carefully choreographed in Chinese form. That said, the Beijing bonanza does repudiate a carefully cultivated narrative China has presented to the U.S.: Namely, that Beijing has limited influence with which to influence its regime.

As Kim’s submissive visit and the reality of Beijing’s financial and export support proves, that Chinese narrative is false. Regardless, the most important consideration here is what China wants from Kim. The North Koreans will almost certainly play nice with the U.S. in the short-term aftermath of any Trump-Kim summit. They’ll suspend new missile and nuclear tests and will even cease most operations at nuclear facilities.

Yet, Kim is highly unlikely to allow the kind of vigorous inspections and program dismantling that would truly test his seriousness about a nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) compromise.

Of course, China knows this and doesn’t care. Xi simply wants to drag out the negotiating process as long as possible so that both he and Kim get their own victories and America is left in limbo.

What would these victories look like? Well, in Kim’s case, the victory would be international sanctions relief, the avoidance of U.S. military action, and the continuing covert development of ICBM strike forces towards a high-confidence redundant capability. In Xi’s case, the victory would be twofold. First, the avoidance of U.S. military strikes on the North that might end Kim Jong Un’s regime and lead to a pro-western government on China’s border.

Second, a reduced U.S. military footprint in South Korea (including removal of the THAAD air defense system China despises) and the broader region. The best summit signal here is the language with which Kim concluded his visit.

The North Korean leader offered to peacefully denuclearize if the U.S. engages in “progressive and synchronous measures for the realization of peace” (code words for canceling training exercises and reducing the U.S. military force presence in the region).

But for Xi, it’s the region, stupid. He knows that even if the U.S. removes its airborne nuclear forces (B-2 bombers, etc.) from the region, it will always keep a powerful military presence in South Korea and retain nuclear strike forces under the waves.

The priority for Xi is that any rolling agreement between the U.S. and North Korea leads the U.S. to cease its challenge of China’s imperial island campaign in the South China Sea. If Xi gets the U.S. to end its defense of free transit through the Pacific commons, he can consolidate his project of regional economic-political hegemony. And that will be a major step towards his ultimate ambition of displacing the U.S. international order.

This is the Xi masterstroke: loop the Korean crisis into the service of Chinese grand strategy.

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